

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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1. On 18 June 1955 there was a meeting of the SED Berlin Area Committee which was also attended by the 1st Secretaries of the Berlin Area Committees of the mass organizations. The theme of the meeting was "political work among the masses" and the main speaker was Erich Hönisch, the Secretary responsible for Agitation and Propaganda at the SED Berlin Area Committee. 25X1
2. Hönisch said, in connection with the Warsaw Agreement, that comrades laid too much emphasis on its military aspect. In future the economic and cultural aspects of the Agreement had to be stressed.
3. He also spoke of the lack of clarity among comrades on the question of strengthening the armed forces of the DDR. The argument used by comrades when recruiting for the KVP or the GST was usually the following: "We must build up national armed forces because we must defend our achievements in the DDR." Practice had shown that, while in principle correct, such an argument was very often received in the wrong way by people who heard it. A large number of young people thought of everything which they lacked and which was available in the West, and could not understand what it was they had to defend. The problem of readiness for defense had, therefore, to be thoroughly explained on the line that no workers' and peasants' state could exist without an army, which was necessary to defend it from the capitalist world around it. If this line were not adopted, recruiting would not get a step further.
4. Hönisch also complained that Party decisions were no longer heeded by comrades in various organizations, which was not surprising since the Party Organizations had still not taken over the leading role in them. He quoted as an example the fact that not only the mass organizations but the Party itself had not been able to get into the press what they wanted. Neues Deutschland and the Berliner Zeitung were cited particularly as being at fault in this respect. He said that the main comment and the most important political happenings were presented in a purely formal manner and insufficient attention was given to Party life.

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5. He then attacked various opinions and attitudes manifest in the Party. He said the current disbelief in the strength of the DDR was having a demoralizing effect. There were comrades who put greater store by proletarian internationalism than by the authority of the DDR. The question was being increasingly asked in Party circles what a future Germany would be like. He said there must be no illusions entertained or speculations made on this point. The answer to all questions was that the future Germany must be "alliance-free and democratic."
6. With regard to the Russian note to Adenauer, Hönisch said some comrades feared that the Soviet Union would conclude a special agreement with the Federal Republic which would not be to the advantage of the DDR. Such comrades must be taken to task seriously, since such an attitude showed convinced disbelief in the correctness and logic of Soviet policy.

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